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Summary 
The  rate of unemployment in the United States has 
exceeded 8 percent since February 2009, making the past 
three years the longest stretch of high unemployment in 
this country since the Great Depression. Moreover, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the 
unemployment rate will remain above 8 percent until 
2014. The official unemployment rate excludes those 
individuals who would like to work but have not searched 
for a job in the past four weeks as well as those who are 
working part-time but would prefer full-time work; if 
those people were counted among the unemployed, the 
unemployment rate in January 2012 would have been 
about 15 percent. Compounding the problem of high 
unemployment, the share of unemployed people looking 
for work for more than six months—referred to as the 
long-term unemployed—topped 40 percent in December 
2009 for the first time since 1948, when such data began 
to be collected; it has remained above that level ever 
since. 
Such persistently high unemployment has wide-ranging 
repercussions: It places financial, psychological, and even 
physical strains on people who are unable to find work 
and on their families as well; it places budgetary pressures 
on the federal government and on state and local govern-
ments, as tax revenues decline and expenditures increase; 
and it results in a long-term erosion of skills that will 
reduce the nation’s productivity and people’s income in 
the future. 
In this study, CBO examines a broad array of policy 
approaches designed to reduce unemployment. Some of 
those policies would aim to boost the economy and 
demand for goods and services, reflecting the fact that the 
increase in unemployment in general and long-term 
unemployment in particular is primarily attributable to 
weak demand for labor, which, in turn, is the result of 
weak aggregate demand. Policies to increase demand for 
workers could reduce unemployment substantially in 
2012 and 2013, although those policies could be costly to 
the federal government and would vary greatly in their 
effectiveness per dollar of budgetary cost. Other policies 
that CBO examined, including worker training, changes 
to the unemployment insurance (UI) system, and helping 
the unemployed transition to new jobs, would probably 
not have a significant effect on the overall unemployment 
rate during the next two years, primarily because of their 
limited scope, but they could provide support to certain 
groups and have longer-run positive effects. 
Unemployment and Its Consequences 
Households with unemployed workers are adversely 
affected by joblessness in many ways. For workers who 
have been displaced through no fault of their own— 
specifically, who lost or left a job because their plant or 
company closed or moved, because there was insufficient 
work for them to do or because their position or shift was 
abolished—the drop in earnings associated with 
losing a job during a recession may persist for many years, 
even when these workers eventually find a new job. Older 
workers and those with long tenure in their previous job 
are especially vulnerable because new jobs for those work-
ers typically pay less and offer less potential for earnings 
growth. Other types of unemployed workers—for exam-
ple, people entering the labor market for the first time 
(typically after completing school)—are also adversely 
affected by a weak economy. People who start their career 
in times of high unemployment tend to have persistently 
lower earnings than their counterparts who begin seeking 
work under better economic circumstances. 
In addition to its immediate and lasting effects on earn-
ings and family finances, unemployment is also correlated 
with deteriorating mental and physical health and with 
increased mortality. A parent’s job loss can lead to worse 
schooling outcomes for children and, ultimately, to worse 
labor market outcomes for those children once they 
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become adults. In those and other ways, unemployment 
is costly for many households, and the adverse effects are 
probably worse for those unemployed for an extended 
period. 
Factors Causing High Unemployment 
Many factors are responsible for the rise in unemploy-
ment in general and in long-term unemployment in 
particular. Explanations include the following: 
• Weak demand for goods and services, as a result of the 
recession and its aftermath, which results in weak 
demand for workers; 
• Mismatches between would-be employers’ needs and 
the skills or location of the unemployed; 
• Incentives from extensions of unemployment insur-
ance for people to stay in the labor force and continue 
searching for work; and 
• T h e erosion of unemployed workers’ skills and the 
belief held by some employers that people who have 
been unemployed for a long time would be low-
quality workers (a phenomenon sometimes called 
stigma). 
Slack demand for goods and services (that is, slack aggre-
gate demand) is the primary reason for the persistently 
high levels of unemployment and long-term unemploy-
ment observed today, in CBO’s judgment; other factors 
appear to play smaller roles. However, when aggregate 
demand ultimately picks up, as it eventually will, so-
called structural factors—specifically, employer-employee 
mismatches, the erosion of skills, and stigma—may con-
tinue to keep unemployment and long-term unemploy-
ment higher than normal. 
Policies to Increase Demand for 
Workers 
In previous work, C B O examined the possible effects of 
a number of policies designed to increase output and 
employment in 2012 and 2013. Those fiscal policy 
actions were intended to increase demand for goods and 
services and raise employment in three key ways: by 
boosting households’ disposable income, by providing 
support to businesses, and by increasing aid to state 
governments or government spending on infrastructure. 
Initiatives that would reduce the marginal cost to busi-
nesses of adding employees or that would target people 
most likely to spend the additional income (generally, 
people with lower income) would have the largest effects 
on employment per dollar of budgetary cost in 2012 and 
2013, CBO found. Policies primarily affecting businesses’ 
cash flow would have little impact on their marginal 
incentives to hire or invest and, therefore, would have 
only small effects on employment per dollar of budgetary 
cost. 
Despite the near-term economic benefits, such actions 
would add to the already large projected budget deficits 
that would exist under current policies, either immedi-
ately or over time. Unless other actions were taken to 
reverse the accumulation of government debt, the nation’s 
output and people’s income would ultimately be lower 
than they otherwise would have been. To boost the 
economy in the near term while seeking to achieve long-
term fiscal sustainability, a combination of policies would 
be required: changes in taxes and spending that would 
increase the deficit now but reduce it later in the decade. 
Lawmakers could also influence employment—and 
unemployment—during the next few years by changing 
policies that do not involve, or whose scope extends well 
beyond, taxation and government spending. In its previ-
ous work, CBO considered some potential changes in 
regulatory and other policies related to energy and the 
environment, the financial and health care sectors, and 
international trade. In CBO’s judgment, the economic 
effects of the changes in regulatory policies or other types 
of policies that the agency examined—apart from fiscal 
policies—probably would be too small, or would occur 
too slowly, to significantly alter overall output or employ-
ment in the next two years. 
1. See the statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, 
Congressional Budget Office, before the Senate Committee 
on the Budget, Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and 
Employment in 2012 and 2013 (November 15, 2011). 
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Other Policies to Reduce 
Unemployment 
Lawmakers could aim to reduce unemployment by 
addressing factors other than weak demand for goods and 
services. In this report, CBO examines initiatives that 
would take the following approaches: 
• Improving workers’ skills, 
• Modifying the unemployment insurance program, or 
• Facilitating transitions to work. 
Examples include training programs (perhaps targeted at 
specific vocations, geographic areas, or age groups); 
changes to unemployment insurance to encourage 
unemployed people to return to work quickly, keep the 
unemployed connected to the workplace, or forestall job 
losses; and programs such as job-search assistance and 
housing-mobility assistance that help the unemployed 
transition to new jobs and locations. Such policies could 
be implemented using mechanisms ranging from provid-
ing funding through block grants to direct federal opera-
tion. But such policies would probably not have a signifi-
cant effect on unemployment over the next two years, 
primarily because the policies the agency examined could 
probably not be implemented on a sufficiently large scale 
during that time. However, by reducing the extent of 
unemployment and long-term unemployment in the 
future, they might have longer-term benefits. 
CBO 
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Unemployment and Its Consequences 
The effects of the recent recession, which began in 
December 2007 and ended in June 2009, have combined 
to make the years since 2007 the worst period of unem-
ployment in the United States since the 1930s. Contr ib-
uting factors include the following: 
• T h e unemployment rate reached a very high level, 
peaking at 10.0 percent in October 2009. Tha t rate 
has been topped in the post–World War II period only 
once before—during the severe 1981–1982 recession 
(see the upper panel of Figure 1). From the end of 
2007 to October 2009, the number of unemployed 
people rose by almost 8 million. (For details about 
how unemployment is defined and measured, see 
Box 1.) 
• Unemployment has been high for an extended period. 
As of January 2012, the unemployment rate had 
been above 8 percent for 36 months and at or above 
9 percent for 28 of the preceding 36 months. In con-
trast, the unemployment rate exceeded 8 percent 
for 26 months and was at or above 9 percent for 
19 months during the recession of the early 1980s. 
• Many people would like to work but have not 
searched for a job in the past four weeks, or are work-
ing part-time but would prefer full-time work. If those 
people were counted among the unemployed, the 
unemployment rate in January 2012 would have been 
about 15 percent. 
• T h e share of unemployment accounted for by the 
long-term unemployed (people who have been seeking 
work for more than 26 weeks) has been at an all-time 
high. Over 40 percent of people who are currently 
unemployed have been out of work for more than half 
a year, as compared with about one-quarter during the 
1981–1982 recession (see the lower panel of 
Figure 1).1 
The extent of long-term unemployment is much greater 
than would be expected on the basis of its historical rela-
tionship with the overall unemployment rate (see 
Figure 2 on page 4). Had long-term unemployment 
followed its historical pattern, it would have been 
between 20 percent and 25 percent of total unemploy-
ment in 2009 and 2010, rather than over 40 percent. 
That high share means that many of the same people 
have been unemployed from month to month and from 
year to year.2 As a result, much of the impact of unem-
ployment has fallen on people who have been unem-
ployed for a long time rather than being shared by a 
wider set of people unemployed for shorter periods. 
1. There are two approaches to measuring the duration of unem-
ployment in the Current Population Survey, which is the basis for 
official U.S. unemployment statistics. The first and more widely 
used method, which the Bureau of Labor Statistics used to pro-
duce the figures reported here, relies on respondents’ retrospective 
characterization of how long they have been unemployed as of the 
survey date. An alternative approach relies on changes in respon-
dents’ characterizations of their labor force status between consec-
utive months. That approach yields different measures of the 
average duration of unemployment. For many respondents, the 
two approaches yield mutually inconsistent information. For 
further discussion, see Michael W. L. Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and 
Aysegul Sahin, The Labor Market in the Great Recession: An 
Update, Working Paper 2011-29 (Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, October 2011), www.frbsf.org/publications/ 
economics/papers/2011/wp11-29bk.pdf. 
2. See Michael W. L. Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin, 
“The Labor Market in the Great Recession,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 1–65, 
www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/past-editions.aspx; and 
Michael W. L. Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin, “Updates 
of a Selection of Figures from Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010)” 
(March 2011), www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/sahin/ 
pub.html. 
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Figure 1 . 
The Unemployment Rate and the 
Long-Term Unemployed as a Share of 
All Unemployed, 1982 to 2011 
(Percent) 
12 
Unemployment Rate 
10 
1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Long-Term Unemployed as a Share of 
All Unemployed 
50 
40 
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0 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Notes: The long-term unemployed have been unemployed for 
more than 26 weeks. 
Data are based on the portion of the population ages 16 and 
older. 
Characteristics of the Unemployed 
People are generally categorized as unemployed if they 
meet the following criteria: 
• They have lost a job (usually as a result of a layoff) or 
have left their previous job voluntarily and are actively 
seeking work; or 
• They have recently entered the labor force (for 
instance, after leaving school for the first time) or 
reentered the labor force and are seeking work. 
People who have been laid off typically account for about 
50 percent of the unemployed, although that share 
increases during recessions. People who quit their previ-
ous job generally account for roughly 10 percent of the 
unemployed, but that share falls during recessions. People 
reentering the labor force (usually about 30 percent) and 
new entrants to the labor force (usually about 10 percent) 
constitute the remainder of the unemployed. 
People who were unemployed in March 2011 came dis-
proportionately (relative to their share of the labor force) 
from certain demographic groups, including men, people 
with at most a high school diploma, married people, 
African Americans, former construction workers, and 
people under age 25 (see Table 1 on page 5). The unem-
ployed and long-term unemployed were distributed 
across the major regions of the country in rough propor-
tion to the labor force, with one exception: Unemploy-
ment was disproportionately high in the West. Broad 
regional categories mask significant variation among 
states, however. For instance, although the unemploy-
ment rate in December 2011 was particularly high in 
western states such as California (11 percent) and Nevada 
(13 percent), it was also high in nonwestern states hit 
hard by the mortgage crisis (Florida, 10 percent) or by 
the difficulties of the automobile industry (Michigan, 
9 percent). In contrast, unemployment rates were much 
lower in states less affected by those events, such as Iowa 
(6 percent), Virginia (6 percent), and Hawaii (7 percent). 
Although their populations are too small to greatly affect 
regional statistics, states such as North Dakota (3 per-
cent), South Dakota (4 percent), and Wyoming (6 per-
cent) all had very low unemployment rates, in part 
because of a boom in the oil industry in those locales. 
CBO 
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Box 1. 
Defining Unemployment 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) compiles labor 
force statistics and computes the unemployment rate 
using data from the Current Population Survey, a 
monthly survey of households that is conducted for 
BLS by the Census Bureau. On the basis of partici-
pants’ responses to the survey adult respondents are 
assigned to one of three labor force categories: 
• Respondents are categorized as employed if they 
have a job or are self-employed at the time of the 
survey. 
• They are categorized as unemployed if they do not 
have a job but would like one and are actively 
searching for a position. Respondents in both 
categories—employed and unemployed—are 
considered to be in the labor force. 
• Respondents who are neither working nor looking 
for work are characterized as out of the labor force. 
People classified as out of the labor force include 
retirees, full-time students who do not have a job, 
and full-time, unpaid caregivers. 
Effects of Job Loss and Unemployment on 
Workers and Their Families 
Unemployment, and especially long-term unemploy-
ment, often leads to adverse consequences for unem-
ployed workers and their families. Various federal pro-
grams assist unemployed people by providing income and 
other support, including some programs that are targeted 
particularly at those with low family income or disabili-
ties (see Box 2 on page 6). Nevertheless, the effects of 
unemployment may be prolonged and may affect work-
ers’ subsequent earnings, their health, and their family’s 
well-being.3 
Reduced Earnings After Job Loss. For many displaced 
workers—those who permanently lose their job through 
no fault of their own—the effects on subsequent earnings 
can be substantial. They initially suffer a decline in earn-
The unemployment rate is then calculated as the frac-
tion of the labor force that is unemployed. 
The distinction between people categorized as 
employed and those in the other two categories is rel-
atively clear-cut. Ambiguities sometimes arise for 
people who are employed but work fewer hours per 
week than they would like or who are working at jobs 
that do not fully utilize their skills. Such workers are 
sometimes described as underemployed, but that des-
ignation is not recognized by BLS as a separate cate-
gory. The distinction between being unemployed and 
out of the labor force is less clear-cut. Each group 
consists of people who are jobless, of course, but 
questions arise as to how to treat respondents who 
would like to work if a suitable job was available but 
who have stopped looking for work. Because they are 
no longer looking for work, such respondents would 
not be considered unemployed and would instead be 
classified as out of the labor force. In some alternative 
categorizations, used by BLS and by other analysts, 
such respondents are characterized as discouraged 
workers and included with the unemployed as a 
measure of those who would like a job but currently 
do not have one. 
ings when they become unemployed. But displaced work-
ers also often suffer longer-term losses in earnings from a 
combination of factors: reduced rates of employment, 
fewer hours worked, and lower hourly wages once they 
find a new job. Data compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) show that, among workers meeting the 
following criteria—they lost a full-time job between 2007 
and 2009, had three or more years of tenure when they 
lost that job, and were working again in January 2010— 
55 percent earned less per week than they had at their 
3. Some evidence suggests that average physical health in the popula-
tion as a whole may improve during recessionary times, in part 
because of reduced consumption of alcohol and tobacco. See 
Christopher J. Ruhm, “Healthy Living in Hard Times,” Journal of 
Health Economics, vol. 24, no. 2 (March 2005), pp. 341–363; and 
Christopher J. Ruhm, “Good Times Make You Sick,” Journal of 
Health Economics, vol. 22, no. 4 (July 2003), pp. 637–658. 
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Figure 2. 
Relationship Between the Unemployment Rate and the Long-Term 
Unemployed as a Share of All Unemployed, 1982 to 2011 
(Long-term unemployed as a percentage of all unemployed) 
50 
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• 1982 to 2007 
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2008 to 2011 
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• • 
0 
0 4 8 9 10 11 12 5 6 7 
Unemployment Rate (Percent) 
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Notes: The long-term unemployed have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. 
Data are based on the portion of the population ages 16 and older. 
The most recent recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. 
The sloped line in the figure represents the historical relationship between the overall unemployment rate and the percentage of the 
unemployed who have been seeking work for more than 26 weeks, reflecting the individual observations that are shown in the figure 
for the years from 1982 to 2007. The points in the figure for 2009 through 2011 are far above that historical relationship. 
previous job, and 36 percent took at least a 20 percent cut 
in weekly earnings.4 Job loss is not always a financially 
costly event, as 45 percent of such displaced workers 
made as much as or more than they did before being laid 
off; but for most workers, job loss is costly.5 
Studies indicate that displaced workers’ earnings may 
be lower for many years after their displacement. Workers 
displaced during the 1982 recession, for example, were 
earning 20 percent less, on average, than their nondis-
placed peers 15 to 20 years later.6 Displaced workers also 
experience greater earnings instability and subsequent 
periods of joblessness than other workers.7 In part, the 
poor outcomes for displaced workers might be attribut-
able to the decline of employment in a particular industry 
or state, rather than, for example, the closure of a specific 
firm. Displaced workers tend to have previously held jobs 
in industries, states, and occupations where employment 
is falling as a result of changes in markets and technolo-
gies. Some of the earnings losses experienced by such 
workers probably reflect their inability to continue work-
ing in those declining industries, states, or occupations 
4. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Worker Displacement, 
2007–2009” (August 26, 2010), www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
disp.nr0.htm. 
5. See Congressional Budget Office, Losing a Job During a Recession, 
Issue Brief (April 2010). 
6. See Till von Wachter, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester, “Long-
Term Earnings Losses Due to Mass Layoffs During the 1982 
Recession: An Analysis Using U.S. Administrative Data from 
1974 to 2004” (draft, Columbia University, April 2009), 
www.columbia.edu/~vw2112. 
7. See Ann Huff Stevens, “Persistent Effects of Job Displacement: 
The Importance of Multiple Job Losses,” Journal of Labor 
Economics, vol. 15, no. 1, part 1 (January 1997), pp. 165–188. 
CBO 
UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO PERSISTENTLY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 5 
Table 1 . 
Characteristics of the Labor Force and the Unemployed, March 2011 
(Percent) 
Labor Force Unemployeda Long-Term Unemployed 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
Educational Attainment 
High school diploma or less 
Some college 
Bachelor's degree 
Graduate degree 
Marital Status 
Not married 
Married 
Race or Ethnicity 
Caucasian 
Hispanic 
African American 
Other 
Industry 
Service 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Other 
No industry history 
Reason for Unemployment 
Lost job involuntarily 
Reentered the labor force 
E ntered labor force fo r first time 
Left job voluntarily 
Age 
16 to 24 
25 to 54 
55 to 69 
Region 
South 
West 
Midwest 
Northeast 
53 
47 
38 
30 
21 
11 
57 
43 
67 
15 
11 
59 
41 
58 
27 
12 
4 
39 
61 
55 
20 
19 
7 6 
47 
10 
7 
34 
39 
10 
14 
29 
1 8 
b 
b 
b 
b 
14 
68 
19 
36 
23 
22 
18 
62 
23 
7 
26 
61 
13 
35 
27 
21 
17 
59 
41 
54 
29 
12 
5 
41 
59 
53 
18 
22 
7 
39 
12 
12 
30 
8 
62 
25 
8 8 
5 
19 
64 
17 
35 
27 
21 
17 
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on the March 2011 Current Population Survey. 
Notes: The labor force comprises people ages 16 and older who have a job or who are jobless but available for work and actively seeking 
employment. 
The long-term unemployed have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. 
a. People are not officially considered unemployed unless they are in the labor force. 
b. Categories do not apply to all people in the labor force. 
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Box 2 . 
Programs That May Aid Unemployed People 
The unemployment insurance (UI) program pro-
vides temporary, partial earnings replacement for eli-
gible workers who have been laid off from their job. 
To qualify for benefits, unemployed people must 
have lost their job through no fault of their own and 
have sufficient recent work histories and sufficiently 
high earnings in their most recent job. UI payments 
range from 30 percent to 50 percent of their previous 
earnings for up to 26 weeks. The federal government 
pays states to administer the program, funds benefits 
for certain groups of unemployed workers, and pro-
vides general guidelines and some restrictions on how 
states may operate their UI programs. Each state sets 
its own eligibility requirements, determines the dura-
tion and amount of regular benefits, and specifies the 
payroll taxes that fund those programs. During the 
recent recession and its aftermath, federal legislation 
enabled states to extend the duration of UI benefits 
to as many as 99 weeks, depending on each state’s 
unemployment rate. In January 2012, more than 
half of the nation’s unemployed were receiving UI 
benefits.1 
Several other federal programs provide assistance 
aimed particularly at people with disabilities or low 
family income.2 The Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP, formerly known as Food 
Stamps) and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) provide assistance to low-income 
families, regardless of their employment history. 
More families have received those benefits since the 
start of the recent recession; and, under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the value of 
SNAP benefits increased, providing an additional 
financial backstop to beneficiaries. 
1. CBO estimated that in 2009, 30 percent of all UI benefits 
went to individuals in households with income less than 
twice the federal poverty threshold and that the poverty rate 
in that year would have been 1.1 percentage points higher 
had it not been for those benefits. See Congressional Budget 
Office, “Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Family 
Income of the Unemployed,” attachment to a letter to the 
Honorable Jim McDermott (November 17, 2010). 
2. For discussion of unemployment insurance and other pro-
grams that might help reduce hardship during unemploy-
ment, see Congressional Budget Office, Losing a Job During a 
Recession, Issue Brief (April 2010). 
Continued 
rather than to their separation from a particular 
employer.8 
Job displacement, unemployment, and the attendant 
drop in earnings have serious effects on many families’ 
overall finances. During the most recent recession, over 
half of the long-term unemployed withdrew money from 
their savings and retirement accounts to cover expenses; 
half had to borrow money from family and friends; and 
8. See William J. Carrington, “Wage Losses for Displaced Workers: 
Is It Really the Firm that Matters?” Journal of Human Resources, 
vol. 28, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 435-462; and Derek Neal, 
“Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced 
Wo r k e r s , ” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 13, no. 4 (October 
1995), pp. 653–677. 
one-third had trouble meeting their housing expenses 
(including making mortgage or rent payments). Such 
outcomes can have adverse effects on family finances in 
the long term because of greater debt or depleted savings, 
higher interest payments (on borrowed money), forgone 
investment income, and higher tax bills (as a result of pre-
maturely withdrawing money from a retirement 
account).9 
9. See Paul Taylor and others, The Impact of Long-Term 
Unemployment: Lost Income, Lost Friends—and Loss of Self-Respect 
(Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, July 22, 2010), 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1674/poll-impact-long-term-
unemployment. 
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Box 2 . 
Programs That May Aid Unemployed 
Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that 
pays for health care services for a variety of individu-
als with low income.3 Health insurance options for 
the unemployed will increase in 2014, as a result of 
expanded eligibility for Medicaid and the availability 
of subsidized coverage through health insurance 
exchanges under the Affordable Care Act enacted in 
2010. 
Less government assistance is available for unem-
ployed workers whose spell of unemployment lasts 
many years. Unemployment insurance eventually 
runs out, and federal support through TANF can be 
3. Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
are important sources of coverage for the children of the 
unemployed, but Medicaid has not been an important source 
of coverage for unemployed workers themselves. See Karyn 
Schwartz and Sonya Streeter, Health Coverage for the 
Unemployed (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 
June 2011), www.kff.org/uninsured/8201.cfm. 
Lower Earnings for New Entrants. The effects of high 
unemployment on people entering the labor market for 
the first time may persist throughout their careers. Labor 
market entrants may face a prolonged search before land-
ing a job, and prevailing wages for entry-level jobs may be 
lower because of limited demand for new workers. One 
recent study of white men who graduated from college 
between 1979 and 1989 found that graduating in a poor 
economy had a long-term negative impact on wages.10 
Adverse Health Effects. In addition to the lasting impact 
on earnings, unemployment and job loss may take a toll 
on people’s health. A review of 104 empirical studies that 
assessed the impact of unemployment concluded that the 
unemployed were physically and psychologically worse 
off than their employed counterparts.11 People who lost 
their job were more likely than other workers to report 
being in fair or poor health and having stress-related 
10. See Lisa Kahn, “The Long-Term Labor Market Consequences of 
Graduating from College in a Bad Economy,” Labour Economics, 
vol. 17, no. 2 (April 2010), pp. 303–316. 
Continued 
People 
received for a maximum of five years. Some of the 
long-term unemployed eventually qualify for dis-
ability benefits through the Social Security Disability 
Insurance program (wherein the amount of the 
benefit is based on the individual’s prior earnings) or 
through the Supplemental Security Income program 
(which is available to people with low income who 
are elderly, blind, or disabled).4 Most people who 
qualify for those two programs leave the labor force 
and do not return to it. Disability insurance recipi-
ents collect those benefits until they qualify for retire-
ment benefits through the Social Security program. 
4. For additional information, see Congressional Budget 
Office, Social Security Disability Insurance: Participation 
Trends and Their Fiscal Implications, Issue Brief (July 2010); 
and Umar Moulta-Ali, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), CRS Report for Congress RL32279 (Congres-
sional Research Service, January 6, 2012). 
health conditions such as depression, stroke, heart dis-
ease, or heart attacks. Further, a substantial minority 
of the long-term unemployed reported having trouble 
getting or paying for medical care.12 Moreover, research 
suggests that the negative effects of job loss on health may 
reduce life expectancy.13 
Family Stresses. People’s anxiety about family finances 
and related issues rose sharply during the most recent 
recession and that anxiety has persisted in its aftermath, 
with heightened concerns about layoffs and reductions in 
11. See Frances McKee-Ryan and others, “Psychological and Physical 
Well-Being During Unemployment: A Meta-Analytic Study,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 90, no. 1 (January 2005), 
pp. 53–76. 
12. See Taylor and others, The Impact of Long-Term Unemployment: 
Lost Income, Lost Friends—and Loss of Self-Respect. 
13. See David J. Roelfs and others, “Losing Life and Livelihood: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Unemployment and 
All-Cause Mortality,” Social Science and Medicine, vol. 72, no. 6 
(March 2011), pp. 840–854. 
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wages, hours, or benefits.14 That anxiety has affected the 
employed as well as the unemployed. 
The loss of income and elevated levels of household stress 
associated with a parent’s job loss, particularly if the 
period of unemployment is prolonged, can also have 
lasting effects on children. According to one study, about 
one in nine children lived with an unemployed parent in 
December 2009.15 Some research suggests that children 
whose fathers lose a job are at elevated risk of problems 
related to personality and emotional development, as well 
as with interpersonal relationships.16 Parental job loss and 
subsequent unemployment are also associated with 
poorer schooling outcomes for children.17 Ultimately, 
children of displaced workers, on average, have poorer 
economic outcomes as adults than the children of other-
wise similar workers who have never experienced job 
loss.18 
Factors Causing High Unemployment 
In December 2007, the unemployment rate was 5.0 per-
cent. Four years later, in December 2011 (when CBO 
14. See Steven J. Davis and Till Von Wachter, “Recessions and the 
Costs of Job Loss” (draft, Columbia University, November 2011), 
www.columbia.edu/~vw2112; and Cliff Zukin, Carl Van Horn, 
and Charley Stone, Out of Work and Losing Hope: The Misery and 
Bleak Expectations of American Workers, Heldrich Center for 
Workforce Development of Rutgers University (September 2011), 
www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/news-updates/all/out-work-and-losing-
hope-misery-and-bleak-expectations-american-workers. 
15. See Phillip Lovell and Julia B. Isaacs, Families of the Recession: 
Unemployed Parents and Their Children (Washington, D.C.: First 
Focus Campaign for Children, June 2010), www.brookings.edu/ 
papers/2010/0114_families_recession_isaacs.aspx. 
16. See Vonnie C. McLoyd, “Socialization and Development in a 
Changing Economy: The Effects of Paternal Job and Income Loss 
on Children,” American Psychologist, vol. 44, no. 2 (February 
1989), pp. 293–302. 
17. See Ann Huff Stevens and Jessamyn Schaller, “Short-Run Effects 
of Parental Job Loss on Children’s Academic Achievement,” Eco-
nomics of Education Review, vol. 30, no. 2 (April 2011), pp. 289– 
299; and Ariel Kalil and Patrick Wightman, “Parental Job Loss 
and Children’s Educational Attainment in Black and White 
Middle-Class Families,” Social Science Quarterly, vol. 92, no. 1 
(March 2011), pp. 57–78. 
18. See Philip Oreopoulos, Marianne Page, and Ann Huff Stevens, 
“The Intergenerational Effects of Worker Displacement,” Journal 
of Labor Economics, vol. 26, no. 3 (July 2008), pp. 455–483. 
C B O 
completed its most recent economic forecast), that rate 
was 8.5 percent. C B O has estimated that the three-and-a-
half percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate 
over that period could be attributed to four factors in the 
following amounts: 
• Weak demand for goods and services as a result of the 
recession and its aftermath, which accounts for about 
two-and-a-half percentage points; 
• Mismatches between the needs of employers and the 
skills and location of the unemployed, which account 
for about one-half of one percentage point; 
• Incentives from extensions of unemployment insur-
ance for people to stay in the labor force and continue 
searching for work, which account for about one-
quarter of one percentage point; and 
• Erosion of skills and the stigma attached to long-term 
unemployment—that is, employers’ perception that 
people who have been unemployed for a long time 
would be low-quality workers—which together 
account for about one-quarter of one percentage 
point. 
Thus , in CBO’s judgment, roughly a third of the net 
increase in unemployment over that four-year period has 
stemmed from factors other than weak demand. Some 
evidence for those other causes comes from shifts in the 
relationship between the job vacancy rate (the ratio of job 
openings to the sum of job openings and employment) 
and the unemployment rate, which is known as the 
Beveridge Curve. An increase in the unemployment rate 
relative to the job vacancy rate may suggest that unem-
ployed workers are facing unusual difficulties finding 
suitable employment among the available job opportuni-
ties. O n e recent study indicates such a shift in the rela-
tionship depicted by the Beveridge Curve: Before the 
recession, a job vacancy rate of 3.0 percent was associated 
with an unemployment rate of 5.0 percent; but, as of 
19. See, for example, remarks by Narayana Kocherlakota, president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, “Inside the 
FOMC” (presented in Marquette, Michigan, August 17, 2010), 
www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/ 
speech_displaycfm?id=4525. 
UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO PERSISTENTLY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 9 
June 2011, that same 3.0 percent job vacancy rate was 
associated with an unemployment rate of 6.4 percent.20 
In that study, about 1 percentage point of the elevated 
unemployment rate was attributed to skill and locational 
mismatches, extended unemployment insurance, and 
other factors. That finding is consistent with CBO’s esti-
mate that about 1 percentage point of the increase in the 
unemployment rate can be attributed to factors other 
than weak current demand. 
Weak aggregate demand is also the primary contributor 
to the increased average duration of unemployment; the 
incentives from the extensions of unemployment insur-
ance benefits and changes in the characteristics of the 
unemployed played smaller roles.21 
Weak Demand for Goods and Services 
Most of the increase in unemployment during the past 
four years and its persistence at a high level have resulted 
from a cyclical decline in the demand for goods and ser-
vices, which has, in turn, decreased employers’ demand 
for workers. Under current law, the cyclical weakness in 
demand stemming from the recent recession and slow 
recovery is likely to persist for the next few years; this 
cyclical weakness will continue to elevate the unemploy-
ment rate, though by diminishing amounts, through 
2017, CBO estimates. 
That weak demand can be attributed to various factors. 
Household spending fell and has remained weak, damp-
ened by a loss of household wealth, an extraordinary 
decline in labor’s share of national income, a desire by 
families and businesses to reduce debt as well as tightened 
lending conditions, and increased uncertainty and 
pessimism—in part reflecting the poor state of the job 
market. Residential construction has been anemic, held 
down by overbuilding during the boom, by poor expecta-
tions for future house prices, and, to a lesser degree, by 
weak household formation—which, like households’ 
uncertainty and pessimism, in part reflects the poor state 
20. See Mary Daly and others, A Rising Natural Rate of Unemploy-
ment: Transitory or Permanent? Working Paper 2011-05 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, September 2011), www.frbsf.org/ 
publications/economics/papers/2011/wp11-05bk.pdf. 
21. See Rob Valletta and Katherine Kuang, Why Is Unemployment 
Duration So Long? Economic Letter 2012-03 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco, September 2011), www.frbsf.org/ 
publications/economics/letter/2012/el2012-03.pdf. 
of the job market. Cutbacks by state and local govern-
ments have left government employment about 1.7 per-
cent lower at the end of 2011 than it was at the end of 
2007, just prior to the recession. 
Moreover, business investment plunged during the reces-
sion, as businesses reacted to a decline in aggregate 
demand, a very uncertain outlook, and tightening credit. 
Since the recession’s end, growth in business investment 
has been a bright spot, relatively speaking, although busi-
ness investment and hiring are still being restrained by 
businesses’ expectations that aggregate demand will con-
tinue to grow only moderately. In addition, some busi-
nesses may be concerned about how they will be affected 
by the implementation of recently enacted legislation 
dealing with the financial system and health care, by the 
government’s regulatory policies in other areas, and by 
possible future changes in federal tax and spending 
policies.22 However, the degree to which each of those 
factors has restrained investment and hiring is difficult 
to determine. 
Mismatches Between Employers’ Needs and the 
Skills and Location of Workers 
A distinctive feature of the U.S. labor market is its dyna-
mism. Individual employers grow and shrink in response 
to changes in demand and business success, workers often 
change jobs as they seek out a position that best fits their 
skills and interests, and there are always shifts in the econ-
omy resulting from changes in technology, consumer 
preferences, and international trade, which have dispro-
portionate effects on certain industries, occupations, and 
locations. The need for workers to shift from one indus-
try or occupation to another, to acquire new skills to 
facilitate such a shift, or even to relocate in order to find a 
new job is often referred to as a skill or locational mis-
match. Those factors mean that there will always be some 
unemployment—which has ranged from about 4 percent 
to 5 percent in recent decades—as firms with unfilled 
openings and workers looking for jobs sort themselves 
into the most productive matches. Economists refer to 
that type of unemployment as frictional and view it as an 
important information-gathering process that leads to 
improved matches between workers and employers 
(although government policies that facilitate or hinder 
22. See Scott Baker, Nick Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, Has Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Hampered the Recovery? Chicago Booth 
Research Paper 12-06 (University of Chicago, February 2012). 
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Table 2. 
Employment, by Industry, 
2007 to 2011 
Industry 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Information 
Financial Activities 
Trade, Transportation, 
and Utilities 
Professional and 
Business Services 
Leisure and Hospitality 
Other Services 
Government 
Mining/Logging 
Educational and Health 
Care Services 
Number of Employees 
(Millions) 
2007 
7.6 
13.9 
3.0 
8.3 
26.6 
17.9 
13.4 
5.5 
22.2 
0.7 
18.3 
2011 
5.5 
11.7 
2.7 
7.6 
24.9 
17.2 
13.2 
5.4 
22.1 
0.8 
20.0 
Percentage 
Change, 
2007-2011 
-28 
-16 
-12 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
-1 
-1 
9 
9 
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
such matching can affect the amount of frictional 
unemployment). 
Unemployment may temporarily rise when extraordinary 
changes in technology or in the demand for various prod-
ucts necessitate a change in the distribution of workers 
among industries, occupations, or locales. As an example, 
the advent of computerized word processing in the 1980s 
greatly reduced the need for typists and secretaries; conse-
quently, many people in those occupations had to find 
other lines of work, and some employers had to search for 
workers skilled in the new technology. At such times, the 
magnitude of skill mismatch increases significantly rela-
tive to its historical average, boosting unemployment 
while those adjustments take place. Such adjustments can 
take months or years, and thus can contribute to long-
term unemployment. 
CBO estimates that an increase in skill and locational 
mismatches accounted for roughly half a percentage 
point of the increase in unemployment during and fol-
lowing the recent recession. That effect will diminish 
gradually over the next five years, in CBO’s judgment, as 
people acquire new skills, shift to faster-growing indus-
tries and occupations, and relocate to take advantage of 
those opportunities.23 
Skill Mismatches. Although one source of such mis-
matches during the past few years has been the decline in 
demand for construction workers that followed the col-
lapse of the housing market, two findings from analyses 
of the distribution of employment among industries sup-
port the conclusion that skill mismatches account for 
a small portion of the rise in unemployment. First, if 
workers’ skills and the needs of growing industries were 
increasingly mismatched, workers laid off in declining 
industries should have a harder time finding new jobs 
than workers laid off in other industries. That has not 
been the case.24 Second, because employment has 
declined in many industries, there are unemployed work-
ers in most broad industry categories who have relevant 
skills and experience (see Table 2; educational and health 
care services is the only large industry showing employ-
ment gains). Nevertheless, shifts in the demand for labor 
could have occurred within broad industry categories. 
Although those facts do not rule out such industrial shifts 
as a partial explanation for elevated unemployment, 
developments affecting all industries are a more impor-
tant part of the story. 
Locational Mismatches. Locational mismatches have 
probably played a minor role in the rise of both unem-
ployment and long-term unemployment, despite the fact 
that unemployment rates vary substantially among states. 
For example, in December 2011, the four states with the 
highest rates of unemployment—California, Nevada, 
Mississippi, and Rhode Island—all had unemployment 
rates exceeding 10 percent. The three states with the 
lowest rates of unemployment—Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota—had rates below 5 percent. 
Although that dispersion in unemployment rates suggests 
locational mismatches between workers and labor 
demand, it is important to note that those latter three 
23. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Out-
look: An Update (August 2011), p. 46. This estimate is roughly in 
line with other recent calculations; for example, see Aysegul Sahin 
and others, “Measuring Mismatch in the U.S. Labor Market” 
(draft, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, October 2011), 
www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/sahin/papers.html. That 
research found that mismatches related to industry and occupa-
tion were substantial and those related to geography were not. 
24. See Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin, The Labor Market in the Great 
Recession. 
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states have small populations and a very small share of the 
nation’s jobs; in contrast, all 10 of the largest states cur-
rently have higher unemployment rates. Thus, national 
unemployment would not decline sharply even if unem-
ployed workers flocked to states with the lowest rates of 
unemployment. 
The severity of locational mismatches may be exacerbated 
if workers cannot relocate because they are unable to sell 
their houses. In historical terms, a large number of home-
owners are “underwater”—that is, their houses are worth 
less than what they owe on their mortgages. Some ana-
lysts suggest that homeowners who are underwater may 
be unable to move to locales where labor demand is 
stronger and where they might find work. Whether that 
is occurring is unclear, however: Three recent studies 
arrive at disparate conclusions as to whether homeowners 
with negative equity have been less mobile than other 
homeowners.25 
Incentives from Extensions of 
Unemployment Insurance 
The UI system helps unemployed workers and their fam-
ilies in several ways. Most directly, the system provides 
income support to people who have lost their job for rea-
sons other than poor performance or misconduct. 
Research has shown that UI helps recipients to maintain 
their standard of living after losing a job. Research also 
suggests that UI allows job seekers to take a more entre-
preneurial career path—which can be productive but 
risky—than they would have taken in the absence of such 
insurance.26 
UI also encourages laid-off workers to continue searching 
for work rather than leaving the labor force, because con-
tinued receipt of UI benefits requires them to be actively 
25. See Fernando Ferreira, Joseph Gyourko, and Joseph Tracy, 
“Housing Busts and Household Mobility,” Journal of Urban 
Economics, vol. 68, no. 1 (July 2010), pp. 34–45; Sam Schulhofer-
Wo h l , Negative Equity Does Not Reduce Homeowners’ Mobility, 
Working Paper 682 (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
December 2010), www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/ 
pub_display.cfm?id=4598; and Fernando Ferreira, Joseph 
Gyourko, and Joseph Tracy, Housing Busts and Household Mobility: 
An Update, Staff Report 526 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
November 2011), http://newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/ 
sr526.html. 
26. See Daron Acemoglu and Robert Shimer, “Productivity Gains 
from Unemployment Insurance,” European Economic Review, 
vol. 44, no. 7 (June 2000), pp. 1195–1224. 
looking for work. That requirement to search for work 
results in some laid-off workers returning to work rather 
than leaving the workforce altogether. However, the avail-
ability of UI also discourages unemployed people from 
taking a job they might consider unsuitable because those 
benefits reduce the hardship of being unemployed. Econ-
omists have traditionally viewed that effect as significant. 
One widely cited study from 1990 found that eligibility 
for five extra weeks of benefits led to, on average, a one-
week increase in the length of an unemployment spell.27 
More-recent studies have suggested, however, that only 
about 40 percent of that one-week increase in the dura-
tion of unemployment was the result of a diminished 
incentive to take a job; the remaining 60 percent of that 
increase represented an expanded search effort, which can 
ultimately result in better job matches.28 
In addition, the availability of UI benefits affects the 
employment of prospective workers who are ineligible for 
benefits, such as those who are new entrants or reentrants 
to the labor force. For example, to the extent that people 
who are receiving benefits are less likely to accept avail-
able jobs, those who are not receiving benefits are more 
likely to obtain and accept job offers. Moreover, by put-
ting money in the hands of people who spend much of it 
on goods and services, UI benefits increase the demand 
for workers needed to produce those goods and services, 
indirectly raising total employment compared with what 
it otherwise would be. Thus, the effects of UI benefits on 
overall employment and unemployment differ from their 
effects on the employment and unemployment of recipi-
ents alone. 
Because of the various ways that UI benefits affect peo-
ple’s incentives and opportunities, analyzing the impact 
of the extensions of benefits (from the usual 26 weeks 
up to 99 weeks) during the recession and its aftermath is 
27. See Lawrence F. Katz and Bruce D. Meyer, “The Impact of the 
Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration 
of Unemployment,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 41, no. 1 
(February 1990), pp. 45–72. For more recent evidence, see David 
Card and Phillip B. Levine, “Extended Benefits and the Duration 
of UI Spells: Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Benefit 
Program,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 78, no. 1-2 
(October 2000), pp. 107–138. 
28. For example, see Raj Chetty, “Moral Hazard Versus Liquidity and 
Optimal Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 116, no. 2 (April 2008), pp. 173–234. 
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difficult. The extensions of benefits have had two types of 
effects: 
• They have increased recipients’ spending and, thus, 
the demand for goods and services in the economy as a 
whole, which has tended to raise employment and 
reduce unemployment. C B O estimates that the two-
and-a-half percentage point increase in unemploy-
ment resulting from weak demand would have been 
greater without the extensions of benefits. 
• At the same time, in order to remain eligible for 
unemployment benefits, more people without jobs 
have continued looking for work—though, in some 
cases, less intensely and more selectively than they 
otherwise would have—after the normal 26-week 
benefit period; in that way, the extensions of benefits 
have kept more jobless individuals in the labor force, 
thereby pushing up the unemployment rate by 
roughly one-quarter of one percentage point, C B O 
estimates. (T hat effect will dissipate shortly after 
those extensions end, whereas the effects of some 
of the other factors raising unemployment will last 
longer.) 
Whether the combination of those two effects has raised 
or lowered the unemployment rate in total in the short 
term is unclear. In CBO’s analysis, which encompassed a 
range of possible effects of UI extensions on demand and 
on people’s choices about staying in the labor force, the 
two effects together could have either raised or lowered 
the unemployment rate. (According to that analysis, 
the UI extensions have raised total employment, which 
has been constrained principally by weak demand for 
labor.) 
UI extensions also contributed to the increase in the pro-
portion of unemployed people who have been seeking 
jobs for more than 26 weeks, in CBO’s judgment. An 
29. For other recent estimates of the direct effects of unemployment 
insurance on unemployment rates (apart from indirect effects on 
labor demand), see Jesse Rothstein, “Unemployment Insurance 
and Job Search in the Great Recession” (draft, University of 
California at Berkeley, October 2011), http://gsppi.berkeley.edu/ 
faculty/jrothstein/workingpapers/Rothstein-UI-Oct2011.pdf; 
and, see Henry S. Farber and Robert Valetta, “Extended Unem-
ployment Insurance and Unemployment Duration in the Great 
Recession: The U.S. Experience” (draft, Princeton University, 
June 2011), www.irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/event/uploads/ 
HenryFarber112811.pdf. 
important feature of the UI system is that only displaced 
workers are eligible for UI benefits; those who quit their 
job and people new to or reentering the labor force are 
generally not eligible. Thus, the disincentives to work 
stemming from the extensions of UI mainly affected 
displaced workers, particularly those who had already 
received benefits for 26 weeks. In fact, between 2008 
and 2010, the percentage of long-term unemployed 
among people who had lost jobs rose much more than 
that percentage among people who became unemployed 
for reasons other than job loss (see Figure 3). A recent 
study analyzing such differences found that UI extensions 
during and after the recent recession elevated the share of 
long-term unemployment.30 
“Stigma” and the Erosion of Skills 
Regardless of its initial cause, unemployment in general 
and long-term unemployment in particular can lead to 
subsequent difficulties for the affected workers. One 
mechanism by which unemployment reduces future 
employment prospects is through the stigma attached to 
long-term unemployment—that is, an employer’s infer-
ence that people who have been unemployed for a long 
time are low-quality workers. Long-term unemployment 
may also erode workers’ skills, and those two factors— 
stigma and skill erosion—may have interactive effects. 
The extent to which stigma and skill erosion increased 
unemployment and long-term unemployment during 
and after the most recent recession is difficult to quantify. 
CBO estimates that those factors currently account for 
about a quarter of a percentage point of the increase in 
unemployment during and following the recession; CBO 
expects that effect to grow to about half a point during 
the next several years, and then to persist at that level for 
several more years before gradually diminishing. 
Stigma. Prospective employers might interpret long-term 
unemployment as a negative signal about the worker’s 
skills, motivation, and general employability.31 When 
the unemployment rate is very high, however, employers 
may infer that a prospective worker’s unemployment is 
30. See Robert Valletta and Katherine Kuang, Extended Unemployment 
and UI Benefits, Economic Letter 2010-12 (Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco, April 2010), www.frbsf.org/publications/ 
economics/letter/2010/el2010-12.html. 
3 1 . For additional information, see Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, “EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unemployed Job 
Seekers” (transcript of meeting held February 16, 2011), 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-11/index.cfm. 
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Figure 3. 
attributable to overall economic conditions rather than to 
his or her own shortcomings. Some research, for example, 
found smaller stigma effects for workers who lost their 
job as a result of a plant closing rather than through a 
more selective layoff process.32 Still, even if weak eco-
nomic conditions lead to less stigma for any given dura-
tion of unemployment, stigma may be greater the longer 
a spell of unemployment lasts. Long-term unemployment 
may thus produce a self-perpetuating cycle wherein pro-
tracted spells of unemployment heighten employers’ 
reluctance to hire those individuals, which in turn leads 
to even longer spells of joblessness. 
Erosion of Skills. Workers acquire skills through on-the-
job training or, more commonly, through work experi-
32. See Robert Gibbons and Lawrence F. Katz, “Layoffs and Lemons,” 
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 9, no. 4, (October 1991), 
pp. 351-380; and Martin Biewen and Susanne Steffes, “Unem-
ployment Persistence: Is There Evidence for Stigma Effects?” 
Economic Letters, vol. 106, no. 3 (March 2010), pp. 188–190. 
UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO PERSISTENTLY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 13 
ence. Evidence that skills erode during periods of unem-
ployment comes in part from studies on the negative 
effects that time out of the labor force has on wages.33 
Skill erosion may take the form of lost familiarity with 
the technical aspects of an occupation, such as how to use 
particular computer programs or how to manipulate cer-
tain equipment. Skill erosion is particularly problematic 
when the technology used in an occupation changes 
regularly—in such instances, even unemployed workers 
who maintain their old skills may fall behind because 
they do not actively work with newer technologies. The 
erosion of people’s productive capacity can take other 
forms; for example, an unemployed salesperson may lose 
contact with a particular client base or with the particular 
market niche in which he or she previously operated. 
33. See Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz, 
“Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the 
Financial and Corporate Sectors,” American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, vol. 2, no. 3 (July 2010), pp. 228–255. 
Long-Term Unemployment During and Immediately Following Three Recent 
Recessions, by Reason for Unemployment 
(Percentage of unemployed people) 
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Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups. 
Notes: The long-term unemployed have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. 
Data are based on the portion of the population ages 16 and older. 
The category “other reasons” encompasses people who have reentered the labor force, entered the labor force for the first time, or 
left their previous job voluntarily. 
The last three recessions in the United States spanned the following periods: July 1990 to to March 1991; March 2001 to November 
2001; and December 2007 to June 2009. 
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Although the specific knowledge that is lost or made 
obsolete varies by industry and occupation, some erosion 
probably occurs in all but the most low-skilled jobs, and 
the erosion of skills is a pervasive problem among the 
long-term unemployed. 
Policies to Increase Demand for 
Workers 
Policies that increase demand for workers address the sin-
gle most important factor behind today’s persistently high 
unemployment rates—weak demand for goods and ser-
vices. C B O has previously assessed the potential impact 
of a variety of temporary fiscal policy actions that might 
promote economic growth and increase employment in 
the near term. This section summarizes those earlier 
estimates and the agency’s findings about other options 
that could affect the demand for workers. 
Fiscal Policies 
Each of the policy options that C B O previously analyzed 
would primarily affect the economy in one of three differ-
ent ways: 
• By boosting households’ disposable income, 
• By providing support to businesses, or 
• By increasing aid to state governments or government 
spending on infrastructure. 
Using evidence from empirical studies and econometric 
models, C B O assessed the impact of such policies on the 
nation’s output (GDP) and total employment in 2012 
and 2013 per million dollars of total budgetary cost 
(measured in terms of additional government spending or 
reduction in taxes). To encompass most economists’ 
views about the effects of each type of policy, C B O used 
low and high estimates of the effects on output and 
employment. By CBO’s estimates, the impact of the poli-
cies would range from a very small increase in employ-
ment to an increase of as much as 19 years of full-time-
equivalent (FTE) employment per million dollars of 
budgetary cost over that two-year span (see Figure 4). 
(An FTE-year is 40 hours of employment per week for 
one year.) 
On the basis of that analysis, C B O concluded the 
following: 
• Policies that would have the largest effects on employ-
ment per dollar of budgetary cost in 2012 and 2013 
are those that would reduce the marginal cost to busi-
nesses of adding employees or that would target peo-
ple most likely to spend the additional income. Such 
policies include reducing employers’ payroll taxes 
(especially if limited to firms that increase their pay-
roll), increasing aid to the unemployed, and providing 
additional refundable tax credits in 2012 for lower-
and middle-income households; and 
• Policies that would primarily affect businesses’ cash 
flow but would have little impact on their marginal 
incentives to hire or invest would have only small 
effects. Such policies include reducing business 
income taxes and reducing tax rates on repatriated 
foreign earnings. 
All of the options that C B O considered were sufficiently 
scalable—that is, able to be increased in size in an effi-
cient manner—such that they could entail at least 
$10 billion in spending increases or tax cuts in 2012 and 
2013. The estimated effects of the policies on economic 
output varied from as little as 10 cents per dollar of bud-
getary cost to as much as $1.90 per dollar of budgetary 
cost. A rough rule-of-thumb applicable to the policies 
shown in Figure 4 would be the following: An additional 
$30 billion used in 2012 for an option that would boost 
employment in 2012 and 2013 by about 9 FTE-years per 
million dollars of total budgetary cost would translate 
into a reduction in the unemployment rate of one-tenth 
of one percentage point (say, at the beginning of 2013). 
Thus , changes in fiscal policy, if appropriately designed 
and large in scale, could substantially reduce unemploy-
ment during the next few years. 
34. See the statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congres-
sional Budget Office, before the Senate Committee on the 
Budget, Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 
2012 and 2013 (November 15, 2011). 
35. A recent example of a large-scale fiscal policy action is the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which by 
CBO’s estimate will ultimately have a budgetary cost of about 
$825 billion, reduced the unemployment rate in 2010 by between 
0.4 and 1.8 percentage points. See Congressional Budget Office, 
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from July 2011 Through Septem-
ber 2011 (November 2011). 
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Figure 4. 
Ranges of Cumulative Effects of Policy Options on Employment in 2012 and 2013 
Increasing Aid to the Unemployed 
Providing Additional Refundable Tax Credits to 
Lower- and Middle-Income Households in 2012 
Reducing Employees’ Payroll Taxes 
Subsidizing the Interest Rate on 
Certain Mortgages That Are Refinanceda 
Extending Higher Exemption Amounts for the 
Alternative Minimum Tax 
Reducing Income Taxes in 2013 Relative to 
Those Specified in Current Law 
Reducing Employers’ Payroll Taxes 
Reducing Employers’ Payroll Taxes for 
Firms That Increase Their Payroll 
Allowing Full or Partial Expensing of Investment Costsb 
Reducing Taxes on Business Income 
Reducing Tax Rates on Repatriated Foreign Earningsb 
Providing Aid to States for Purposes 
Other Than Infrastructure 
Spending on Infrastructure 
Household Assistance 
Business Support 
Aid to State Governments or 
Spending on Infrastructure 
10 12 14 16 18 20 
Years of FTE Employment per 
Million Dollars of Total Budgetary Cost 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Notes: The ranges of estimates were chosen, on a judgmental basis, to encompass most economists’ views. 
Estimates represent years of full-time-equivalent employment (FTE-years) with a given policy minus FTE-years without the policy. 
(An FTE-year is 40 hours of employment per week for one year.) Estimates are per million dollars of total budgetary cost, which is the 
amount of tax revenues or outlays over the full duration of a policy’s effects, except as specified in note b below. 
All years are calendar years. Unless otherwise specified, increased spending authority was assumed to be available as of January 2012, 
and tax options were assumed to be in effect only for 2012. 
a. Includes the effects of extending higher exemption amounts for the alternative minimum tax in 2012. 
b. For this option, total budgetary cost is calculated as a discounted present value rather than as the sum of changes in tax revenues over the 
full duration of the policy’s effects. 
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Those policy actions would generally decrease FTE-years 
of unemployment by the same amount that they would 
increase FTE-years of employment, with the exception of 
the option of increasing benefits for unemployment 
insurance. In the current economic climate, extensions of 
UI benefits affect the labor market through some chan-
nels that tend to increase the number of employed people 
(such as by increasing demand for goods and services). 
However, such extensions also tend to increase the num-
ber of unemployed people (for example, because more 
jobless workers choose to remain in the labor force in 
order to receive benefits). Thus, the net effect of addi-
tional spending for unemployment insurance on the 
number of unemployed people is unclear.36 
Policies not analyzed in CBO’s previous work, such 
as direct government employment in public service 
jobs, could also reduce unemployment. The federal 
government hired millions of unemployed workers dur-
ing the Great Depression through the Work Projects 
Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. 
More recently, under the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act, the federal government provided aid to 
states to place applicants to the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) program in jobs.37 It might be 
difficult, however, to efficiently and productively imple-
ment a program involving direct hiring on a scale at 
which spending would exceed $10 billion in 2012 and 
2013—a criterion that CBO used when selecting policies 
to analyze in its previous work. 
The fiscal policy approaches discussed above would 
increase total demand for workers, although some— 
such as tax credits for firms that expand payroll— 
36. According to CBO’s low estimate, which incorporates a smaller 
effect on demand and a larger effect on people’s choices about 
staying in the labor force, an extension of UI benefits would cause 
unemployment to increase. Conversely, according to the agency’s 
high estimate, which incorporates a larger effect on demand and a 
smaller effect on people’s choices about staying in the labor force, 
UI extension would cause unemployment to decrease. 
37. In the year and a half that those funds were available, 39 states and 
several territories used $1.3 billion to create short-term subsidized 
jobs, roughly equally divided between summer jobs for youth and 
jobs for adults. See LaDonna Pavetti, Liz Schott, and Elizabeth 
Lower-Basch, Creating Subsidized Employment Opportunities for 
Low-Income Parents: The Legacy of the TANF Emergency Fund 
(Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
February 2011), www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view& 
id=3400. 
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could explicitly target the long-term unemployed. People 
who have been unemployed for a long time could still 
benefit from untargeted approaches even if most jobs 
directly created by the policies went to other groups. 
Despite the near-term economic benefits that would arise 
from reductions in taxes and increases in government 
spending, such actions would add to the already large 
projected budget deficits that would exist under current 
policies, either immediately or over time. Unless offset-
ting actions were taken to reverse the accumulation of 
additional government debt, the nation’s capital stock 
(that is, the tools, machines, and factories used in produc-
tion), its future output, and people’s future income would 
tend to be lower than they otherwise would have been. 
If policymakers wanted to boost the economy in the near 
term while seeking to achieve fiscal sustainability over the 
long term, a combination of policies would be required— 
specifically, changes in taxes and spending that would 
widen the deficit now but reduce it later in the decade. 
Such an approach would work best if the future policy 
changes were sufficiently specific and widely supported so 
that households, businesses, state and local governments, 
and participants in financial markets believed that the 
future fiscal restraint would truly take effect. 
Other Types of Legislative Actions 
Lawmakers could also influence the demand for workers 
during the next few years by changing policies that do not 
involve, or whose scope extends well beyond, taxation 
and government spending. For example, legislation could 
modify existing or proposed regulations, significantly 
alter the government’s role in a particular sector of the 
economy, or change trade relationships with other coun-
tries. The near-term economic impact of changing a reg-
ulation or other policy—apart from fiscal policy—would 
depend importantly on how doing so affected businesses’ 
investment and hiring decisions. In addition, changes in 
policies that increased or decreased households’ purchas-
ing power or wealth would affect how much they spend. 
Finally, changes to regulations and other policies could 
affect expectations about future income or make busi-
nesses and households more or less uncertain about 
future government policies and economic conditions, 
which would affect economic growth and employment in 
the near term. 
CBO has previously discussed some potential changes in 
regulatory policies and other policies related to energy 
and the environment, the financial and health care 
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Table 3. 
Funding for Training Under the 
Workforce Investment Act (Title I), 
Fiscal Year 2012 
Funding in 
Billions of Dollars 
State Formula Grant Programs 
Youth Activities Formula Grants 0.8 
Adult Activities Formula Grants 0.8 
Dislocated Worker Grants 1.2 
Job Corps 1.7 
National Programs _0_._4 
Total 4.9 
Source: David H. Bradley, The Workforce Investment Act and the 
One-Stop Delivery System, CRS Report for Congress 
R41135 (Congressional Research Service, January 13, 
2012). 
sectors, and international trade.38 But estimating the 
near-term effects of such policy changes on overall eco-
nomic activity is exceedingly difficult, and few analytic 
tools are available for that purpose. Accordingly, CBO 
did not attempt to quantify the effects of those potential 
changes with any precision. (Other types of policy 
changes that do not require legislation, such as those 
related to monetary policy or those that can be imple-
mented by federal agencies under current law, could also 
affect economic activity, but they were outside the scope 
of that analysis.) 
Some of the changes in policies that CBO considered in 
its previous work would probably raise output and 
employment over the next few years; other changes would 
probably lower output and employment; and some 
changes would have effects on economic activity that are 
difficult to determine. However, in CBO’s judgment, the 
economic effects of the specific changes in regulatory pol-
icies or other policies that the agency discussed in its pre-
vious work—apart from those related to fiscal policy— 
38. Those policies include the approval process for energy projects, 
regulations regarding emissions from coal-burning power plants, 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Public Law 111-203), the Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-
148), and free-trade agreements. See Congressional Budget 
Office, Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 
2012 and 2013, pp. 44–52. 
probably would be too small or would occur too slowly to 
significantly alter overall unemployment in the next two 
years. That analysis did not speak to other considerations 
that are critical when evaluating such policy changes, 
including their long-term effects on the economy, on 
people’s health, and on the environment. 
The policy changes that CBO examined were illustrative 
rather than exhaustive; many others, which might have 
larger or smaller economic effects, are possible. One such 
policy that CBO did not previously analyze would be a 
reduction in the minimum wage. Although estimates 
have varied, the bulk of the evidence indicates that such a 
reduction would increase employment by a small amount 
and correspondingly reduce unemployment by a small 
amount.39 The effects would be largest for teenage and 
other low-skill workers whose wages are affected by the 
legal minimum. One factor limiting the potential effec-
tiveness of such a policy, however, is that 41 states and the 
District of Columbia have their own minimum wages 
that are equal to or higher than the federal minimum 
(although they differ somewhat in their coverage of work-
ers and in their enforcement); lowering the federal mini-
mum would have little or no effect in those states. Also, 
current federal policy already makes some allowance for 
lower minimum wages for students and youths. 
Other Policies to Reduce 
Unemployment 
Other types of policies could aim to reduce unemploy-
ment by addressing factors other than weak aggregate 
demand for goods and services. The United States cur-
rently has numerous programs that aim to help job seek-
ers in those ways. Some of those programs provide 
services—including job-search assistance, counseling, and 
training—through One-Stop Career Centers operated by 
state and local workforce-development agencies. For fiscal 
year 2012, the Congress has appropriated $4.9 billion for 
those services and other training activities under title I of 
the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, including the Job 
Corps and a variety of grants to states (see Table 3). In 
addition to those dedicated funds, the federal govern-
ment spends $10 billion to $12 billion per year on other 
39. See David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The 
New Economics of the MinimumWage (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1997); and David Neumark and William L. 
W a s c h e r , Minimum Wages (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010). 
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training programs, though there is some overlap and 
administrative inefficiency in those programs. 
Relative to the size of the workforce, the United States 
spends far less on formal training programs for the unem-
ployed than most other industrialized nations. How-
ever, a considerable amount of federal financial support is 
available for individuals pursuing training through com-
munity colleges and through certain proprietary educa-
tion and training organizations. Among existing pro-
grams that aim to help job seekers, some appear to have 
generated high rates of return for some groups, but others 
have had no impact and may, indeed, have had harmful 
43 
effects. 
C B O has examined a number of policies that would 
focus on the unemployed and long-term unemployed in 
one of the following three ways: 
• Improving the skills of unemployed workers, 
• Modifying unemployment insurance to provide con-
tinued support to the long-term unemployed or to 
encourage the unemployed to take new jobs quickly 
and retain their work skills, or 
40. See Government Accountability Office, Multiple Employment and 
Training Programs: Providing Information on Colocating Services 
and Consolidating Administrative Structures Could Promote Efficien-
cies, GAO-11-92 (February 9, 2011), www.gao.gov/products/ 
GAO-11-92. GAO estimates that the federal government spent 
about $12 billion on training programs in fiscal year 2010. 
41. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
OECD Employment Outlook: 2011 (Paris: OECD, September 
2011), pp. 264–273, www.oecd.org/employment/outlook. 
42. For example, the United States spent $30 billion on Pell grants 
during the 2009–2010 academic year. About $12 billion of that 
total was spent on independent students attending two-year or 
proprietary institutions. See Department of Education, Office of 
Postsecondary Education, 2009–2010 Federal Pell Grant Program 
End-of-Year Report (undated), www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/ 
resources/data/pell-2009-10/pell-eoy-2009-10.html. 
43. For reviews, see David Card, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber, 
“Active Labor Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis,” Eco-
nomic Journal, vol. 120, no. 548 (November 2010), pp. F452– 
F477; and James J. Heckman, Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. 
Smith, “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Mar-
ket Programs,” in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Hand-
book of Labor Economics (Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V./North 
Holland, 1999), pp. 1865–2097. 
• Facilitating transitions to work. 
C B O has not estimated the effects on employment of any 
specific policy. The impact on employment per dollar of 
budgetary cost for those policies would probably be 
within the broad range of effects for the fiscal policies dis-
cussed earlier. But another important consideration for 
understanding the effects of such policies involves their 
potential scale; for many of those activities, spending tens 
of billions of additional dollars in 2012 and 2013 would 
be difficult. For that reason, their potential impact on the 
unemployment rate during the next two years is limited. 
Many of the policies that C B O examined for this report 
would involve collaboration between the federal govern-
ment and states or other entities. Key elements of the pol-
icies include the funding mechanism, the amount of 
funding, and the program design. The extent to which 
federal policymakers would influence the specific design 
of the programs would depend on the details of the legis-
lation and the funding mechanism. (For a discussion of 
funding mechanisms, see Box 3). 
Improving Workers’ Skills 
Training programs—including those designed to develop 
general workforce skills and programs that target specific 
industries and occupations in specific locations—could 
make the long-term unemployed more attractive to 
employers by addressing skills mismatch, skill erosion, 
and stigma. The benefits of training programs depend on 
the skills unemployed workers already have and their 
work experience. Unemployed high school dropouts 
might benefit greatly from basic skills training, whereas 
more-highly skilled workers might be better served by 
specialized training. The higher earnings from better 
training for young people accrue for many years and are 
more likely to exceed the investment cost; investment 
returns would probably be lower for older workers with 
fewer years before retirement. 
General Workforce Programs. Well-designed training 
programs improve the employment and earnings out-
comes of properly targeted participants, at least in the 
short run, and can lead to higher output. Training pro-
grams funded under the Job Training Partnership Act of 
1982 had positive effects on adult participants’ earnings 
(relative to a control group) for up to four years following 
C B O 
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Box 3. 
Funding Mechanisms 
If federal lawmakers wanted to address unemploy-
ment by improving workers’ skills, modifying the 
unemployment insurance program, or facilitating 
transitions to work, they could use various types of 
funding mechanisms to support those efforts. 
• Block grants typically give states broad flexibility 
to use funds to tailor programs to local conditions. 
For example, the Communi ty Services Block 
Grant program, which is administered by the 
Department of Health and H u m a n Services, pro-
vides states with funding for local entities that 
offer services and sponsor activities addressing 
employment, education, household budgeting, 
housing, nutrition, emergency services, and 
health. 
• Categorical formula grants are directed to speci-
fied activities. For example, funding for the train-
ing of displaced workers is currently provided to 
states as a categorical grant; the formula allocating 
funds depends on states’ shares of overall unem-
ployment and long-term unemployment and on 
other factors. Categorical grants are sometimes 
structured to require state matching funds or to 
reimburse states for qualifying activities. 
1. For further discussion of these approaches, see Shama 
Gamkhar, Federal Intergovernmental Grants and the States: 
Managing Devolution (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2002). 
• Categorical project grants are generally awarded 
on the basis of a particular proposal’s perceived 
merits. For instance, the Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance Communi ty College and Career Training 
Grants Program, which is administered by the 
Department of Labor, competitively awards grants 
of this type to institutions of higher learning that 
provide services to certain displaced workers. 
• Federal operation of programs typically involves 
direct federal contact with participating entities, 
rather than partnership with state and local gov-
ernments. The Job Corps, for example, provides 
training opportunities to low-income youth, and 
the Department of Labor directly contracts with 
participating institutions on behalf of eligible 
clients. 
The different funding mechanisms entail different 
degrees of federal involvement. The role of the federal 
government in selecting, implementing, and oversee-
ing the various programs is typically limited when 
those programs are funded through block grants and 
much more extensive for direct operation. Tha t role 
can vary greatly for programs funded through cate-
gorical formula or project grants, depending on how 
the authorizing legislation is written. 
2. See Harry J. Holzer, “Raising Job Quality and Skills for 
American Workers: Creating More-Effective Education and 
Workforce Development Systems in the States,” Brookings 
Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-10 (November 
2011), www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/11_workforce 
_holzer.aspx. 
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training. The extent to which the training approaches 
studied might work for the long-term unemployed, 
however, is unclear. Those who benefited the most from 
the training were those with the least skills and work 
experience. Because many of the long-term unemployed 
have work experience and basic job skills, they may need 
higher-level training to obtain new jobs that pay more 
than entry-level wages. 
Sectoral Programs. Postsecondary education and training 
programs that target local employers’ specific needs have 
had positive results for participants. For example, accord-
ing to one study, additional education and training at 
community colleges that led to degrees or certificates 
contributed to economic gains for displaced workers who 
were unlikely to return to their previous occupations and 
45 
industries. 
Sectoral employment programs have grown in promi-
nence in recent years, and well-run programs have suc-
cessfully placed participants in jobs and improved both 
wage rates and annual earnings. Sectoral employment 
programs work with employers in narrow geographic 
areas (at the county level, for instance) to identify hiring 
needs in specific industries and occupations. The pro-
grams then develop training curricula to prepare the 
target populat ion—the unemployed and those who left 
the labor force specifically to pursue training—for the 
jobs available in the area. Examples of successful sectoral 
training programs include those that have focused on: 
• Medical and basic office skills and computerized 
accounting; 
44. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability 
Office), Job Training Partnership Act: Long-term Earnings and 
Employment Outcomes, GAO/HEHS-96-40 (March 1996); and 
Peter R. Mueser, Kenneth R. Troske, and Alexey Gorislavsky, 
“Using State Administrative Data to Measure Program Perfor-
mance,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 89, no. 4 
(November 2007), pp. 761–783. 
45. Louis Jacobson, Robert LaLonde, and Daniel Sullivan. “Estimat-
ing the Returns to Community College Schooling for Displaced 
Wo r k e r s , ” Journal of Econometrics, vol. 125, nos. 1-2 (2005), 
pp. 271–304. 
46. For a review of successful sectoral training programs, see Sheila 
Maguire and others, Tuning In to Local Labor Markets: Findings 
from the Sectoral Employment Impact Study (Public/Private 
Ventures, July 2010), www.ppv.org/ppv/publication.asp? 
section_id=26&search_id=&publication_id=325. 
• Information technology and computer recycling and 
refurbishing; and 
• Health care, manufacturing, and certain types of con-
struction jobs (road construction and the abatement 
of lead and other hazardous materials). 
Although some sectoral training programs have enjoyed 
success, practitioners are still learning how to best operate 
such programs, and it is unclear whether the programs 
can be applied on a sufficiently comprehensive scale to 
significantly reduce unemployment and aid the long-
term unemployed nationwide, particularly in the next 
two years. 
Programs Focused on Youth. Special policies may be 
needed to deal with unemployment and long-term 
unemployment among young workers. Overall unem-
ployment rates are highest for the young, especially teen-
agers (23.2 percent in January 2012, as compared with an 
overall rate of 8.3 percent), and many young people are 
among the long-term unemployed. Policies that improve 
schooling and training options for young people— 
particularly those from low-income families—can 
enhance their future employment prospects. Potential 
approaches include the expanded use of career academies 
and programs such as the National Guard Youth 
ChalleNGe for high-school-age youth and Registered 
Apprenticeship programs and Year Up for older youth. 
Career academies are small learning communities of high 
school students that combine academic and technical 
curricula with a focus on specific careers. Career acade-
mies were first developed some 35 years ago, and the 
approach is currently used in an estimated 2,500 high 
schools. Evaluations of career academies found lasting 
positive effects on participants admitted to the program 
through a lottery process in comparison with a group of 
equally qualified applicants who were not admitted 
through that same process. For example, one study found 
that, four years after graduation, young men from low-
income families who participated in the academies had 
worked an average of about three months more than their 
nonparticipating peers. 
47. See James J. Kemple, Career Academies: Impacts on Labor Market 
Outcomes and Educational Attainment (New York: MDRC, 
March 2004), www.mdrc.org/publications/366/overview.html. 
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The National Guard Youth ChalleNGe program targets 
high school dropouts between the ages of 16 and 18 who 
are not heavily involved with the justice system and who 
are drug-free. The program provides education and ser-
vice experience to participants in a residential, quasi-
military setting for 20 weeks, along with a year of men-
toring after the residential component has been 
completed. Established in 1993, the program has about 
100,000 graduates. Evaluations of the program indicate 
that participants earned GEDs and high school degrees at 
far higher rates than a similar group of nonparticipants. 
Those who participated in the program were also more 
likely to be employed and have higher earnings than their 
peers who had not participated.48 
Registered Apprenticeship programs coordinated by the 
Department of Labor provide specific job and trade 
skills to participants through work-based learning and 
academic instruction. About half a million people partici-
pate in Registered Apprenticeship programs in the United 
States, proportionately far less than in other industrial-
ized countries, such as Austria and Germany.49 Some 
research suggests that the employment and earnings gains 
associated with apprenticeship programs exceed those of 
training obtained through community colleges and under 
the Workforce Investment Act.50 Because the federal role 
has been limited to coordination of Registered Appren-
ticeship programs (federal funding was $28 million in 
2011), a policy that substantially expanded federal 
support might require greater federal involvement and 
oversight. 
48. See Megan Millenky and others, Staying on Course: Three Year 
Results of the National Guard Youth ChallenNGe Evaluation 
(New York: MDRC, June 2011), www.mdrc.org/publications/ 
599/overview.html. 
49. See Robert I. Lerman, Lauren Eyster, and Kate Chambers, The 
Benefits and Challenges of Registered Apprenticeship: The Sponsors’ 
Perspective (report submitted by the Urban Institute to the 
Department of Labor, March 2009), www.urban.org/ 
publications/411907.html; and Pahl Gunn and Lalith De Silva, 
Registered Apprenticeship: Findings from Site Visits to Five States 
(report submitted by Planmatics to the Department of Labor, 
November 2008), http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/keyword 
.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_resultDetails&pub_id=2404&mp=y. 
50. See Kevin Hollenbeck, “State Use of Workforce System Net 
Impact Estimates and Rates of Return” (paper presented at 
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 
Conference, Los Angeles, November 7, 2008), http://research 
.upjohn.org/confpapers/1. 
Year U p — a private, nonprofit program—targets young 
people ages 18 to 24 and provides six months of technical 
skills training and classes in business writing and commu-
nication, followed by a six-month internship with a spon-
soring company. Participants are paid a weekly stipend. 
In 2011 , the program enrolled about 1,400 students in 
nine cities. An evaluation of the program found that 
although participants were no more likely than their 
peers to be working a year after completing the program, 
when they did work, their earnings were about 30 percent 
51 
higher. 
Modifying Unemployment Insurance 
Changes to the unemployment insurance program that 
encourage unemployed people to return to work quickly, 
that keep the unemployed connected to the workplace, 
and that even forestall job loss could reduce persistently 
high unemployment in the future. (Other types of 
changes could have different effects.) Although some 
changes could be implemented quickly, several years 
would probably be needed to fully implement most large 
changes—in part because of the multiple levels of govern-
ment involved in the program. Possible changes to the 
UI program could include the following: 
• Extending the duration of unemployment insurance 
benefits; 
• Awarding reemployment bonuses to people who find a 
job quickly; 
• Providing personal reemployment accounts with funds 
for people to purchase services that help them find a 
job; 
• Offering wage insurance payments to people who 
accept a job that pays less than their previous job; 
• Using UI benefits to temporarily place the unem-
ployed in jobs with private-sector employers; 
• Supplementing the earnings of workers who, instead 
of being laid off, are offered reduced hours (commonly 
referred to as short-time compensation, or STC); and 
5 1 . See Anne Roder and Mark Elliott, A Promising Start: Year Up’s 
Initial Impacts on Low-Income Young Adults’ Careers (New York: 
Economic Mobility Corporation, April 2011), www.economic 
mobilitycorp.org. 
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• Targeting more services to people projected to have 
difficulty finding a job. 
Extending Unemployment Insurance Benefits. Emer-
gency benefits for people unemployed more than 26 
weeks will expire beginning in March 2012. A policy that 
extended those benefits would increase demand for goods 
and services, but it would also tend to discourage some 
people from taking jobs and thereby losing their benefits. 
Hence, it would slow the matching of some people to 
jobs and thus cause further erosion in the skills of some 
people with long spells of unemployment. Such a policy 
would cause some jobless workers to choose to remain in 
the labor force to receive benefits, perhaps turning down 
a job they consider unsuitable (thus tending to increase 
unemployment) . But it would also result in some other 
jobless workers taking those jobs and, by boosting 
demand for goods and services, increase overall employ-
ment (thus tending to reduce unemployment) . Because 
of those and other factors discussed above, extending 
unemployment insurance benefits, on net, has boosted 
employment, but its net effect on unemployment is 
unclear. Unlike the other policies considered in this 
section, a large-scale extension of benefits could be imple-
mented quickly. 
Reemployment Bonuses. Policies that provide financial 
incentives for the unemployed to accept a job can reduce 
overall unemployment and guard against long-term 
unemployment. Reemployment bonuses are one-time 
payments to the unemployed who find work within a 
specified period of time after losing their job. Experi-
ments with reemployment bonuses in the 1980s and 
1990s provided mixed evidence regarding whether they 
reduced the number of weeks that unemployed workers 
received UI benefits. The goal underlying such bonuses 
is to forestall long-term unemployment among the newly 
unemployed rather than to provide inducements for the 
long-term unemployed to go back to work. In fact, if 
reemployment bonuses were offered only to the long-
term unemployed, they could paradoxically induce the 
newly jobless to stay unemployed until they qualified for 
bonus payments. 
Although not technically reemployment bonuses, 
employment retention bonuses for the long-term unem-
ployed have been used in the United Kingdom with great 
success. Under the U.K. Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) program, the long-term unem-
ployed who found jobs received a retention bonus 
amounting to £400 (approximately $600) every four 
months for up to two years as long as they continued 
working for at least 30 hours a week and for 13 weeks out 
of every 17.53 Participants also received postemployment 
counseling, tuition assistance, and additional bonuses for 
training. The long-term unemployed who participated in 
the program had significantly higher employment rates 
and earnings than nonparticipants over the entire five-
year study period. Further, the cost to the government of 
providing ERA bonuses to the long-term unemployed 
was less than the projected cost of providing standard 
assistance and services available to those people. 
Personal Reemployment Accounts. Pe rs on al re e mpl oy-
ment accounts are self-managed accounts, typically 
offered to people who are projected to exhaust their UI 
benefits. In 2004, eight states provided $3,000 to selected 
UI recipients and allowed them to use the funds as a 
reemployment bonus or for other reemployment ser-
vices.54 In a related initiative in 2006, eight states pro-
vided $3,000 per year for two years to fund personal 
reemployment accounts for selected UI recipients. Those 
recipients were encouraged to use those accounts to pur-
sue training.55 Although the effect of those accounts on 
recipients was not formally evaluated, they resemble ear-
lier individual training accounts that were found to have 
little impact either on the amount of training received or 
52. See Bruce D. Meyer, “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment 
Insurance Experiments,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 33, 
no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 91–131. 
53. Other population subgroups such as unemployed single parents 
also participated in the ERA demonstration. The only group that 
experienced sustained positive benefits was the long-term unem-
ployed. See Richard Hendra and others, Breaking the Low-Pay, No-
Pay Cycle: Final Evidence from the U.K. Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) Demonstration, Research Report 765 (United 
Kingdom Department for Work and Pensions, August 2011), 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/report_abstracts/ 
rr_abstracts/rra_765.asp. 
54. See Gretchen Kirby and others, Responses to Personal Reemployment 
Accounts (PRAs): Findings from the Demonstration States (report 
submitted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., to the Depart-
ment of Labor, June 2008), www.mathematica-mpr.com/labor/ 
pra.asp. 
55. See Jeffrey Salzman and others, Evaluation of the Career Advance-
ment Accounts Demonstration Project: An Implementation Study 
(report submitted by Social Policy Research Associates to the 
Department of Labor, November 2010), http://wdr.doleta.gov/ 
research/FullText_Documents/ETAOP_2011-17.pdf. 
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on other outcomes in comparison with typical services 
provided in One-Stop centers that involve some counsel-
ing.56 However, the labor market was stronger during that 
demonstration than it is today, and such accounts might 
be more effective in the weak labor market conditions 
projected for the next few years. 
Wage Insurance. Unemployed workers may be reluctant 
to take a job paying less than they previously earned. 
Wage insurance provides reemployed workers some or all 
of the difference between their old wages and their new 
wages for a certain period, say two years. In the mid-
1990s, five Canadian cities tried implementing wage 
insurance programs that offered new UI claimants 
75 percent of the difference in wages for two years if they 
accepted a new job paying less than their previous job. 
However, the wage insurance programs appeared to have 
little effect on the length of time that unemployed work-
ers continued to receive UI benefits in Canada.57 
Temporary Unpaid Work for UI Recipients. If unemploy-
ment insurance was used to subsidize temporary work, 
the unemployed might be able to better maintain basic 
job skills and, at the same time, gain experience in a new 
industry or occupation. Employers could also benefit 
from the work done by those temporary employees— 
whom they would not be paying—and from the oppor-
tunity to evaluate prospective employees in the work-
place. By maintaining and potentially enhancing the 
skills of the unemployed, and by bringing workers and 
employers together, such programs could reduce unem-
ployment. One example of such a program is Georgia 
Works, which seeks to provide work experience to people 
receiving unemployment compensation. That program 
has not been formally evaluated. 
Short-Time Compensation. Short-time compensation 
provides UI benefits to workers who, instead of being laid 
off, are offered the opportunity to work reduced hours by 
their employer. The traditional UI system provides bene-
fits only to workers who have been laid off, thereby creat-
56. See Sheena McConnell and others, Managing Customers’ Training 
Choices: Findings from the Individual Training Account Experiment 
(report submitted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., to the 
Department of Labor, December 2006), www.mathematica-
mpr.com/labor/ita.asp. 
57. See Howard S. Bloom and others, “Testing a Financial Incentive 
to Promote Re-employment Among Displaced Workers: The 
Canadian Earnings Supplement Program (ESP),” Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 2001), 
pp. 505–523. 
ing an incentive for firms to reduce the amount of labor 
they use through layoffs rather than reduced hours. By 
providing UI benefits to those who have their hours cut, 
STC motivates firms to retain more workers at fewer 
average hours per week, potentially reducing layoffs. 
There is evidence suggesting that European nations, such 
as Germany, avoided some of the run-up in unemploy-
ment experienced in the United States because of more 
widespread use of STC policies.58 
Although 20 states operated STC programs embedded 
within their overall UI programs in 2011, those programs 
are not widely used.59 Potential claimants may be 
unaware of the programs if they are not widely publicized 
by the states. One disadvantage of such programs is that 
short-time work may be uneconomical for workers who 
have lengthy commutes or other fixed costs associated 
with employment and also for employers who may have 
to continue paying full benefits to workers that they oth-
erwise would have laid off. Also, STC is currently 
designed to be an alternative to temporary or seasonal 
layoffs, wherein firms expect to recall laid-off workers 
after several months. However, temporary layoffs are 
increasingly uncommon—in part because of the long-
term decline in the share of employment in unionized 
and manufacturing firms, where temporary layoffs have 
been historically common. 
Some potential advantages of STC programs—particu-
larly in a recession when firms are uncertain about 
demand for their services or products—are that firms and 
workers gain time to make adjustments while maintain-
ing valuable human capital. For example, if a firm is not 
able to return to its previous full-time employment level, 
natural attrition may make it possible to increase the 
hours of remaining employees over time, even if the total 
hours needed are permanently lower. For workers, the 
losses caused by reduced work are spread across a larger 
group of people rather than being concentrated on people 
who have been laid off. Further, workers may use the 
58. See Pierre Cahuc and Stephane Carcillo, “Is Short-Time Work a 
Good Method to Keep Unemployment Down?” Nordic Economic 
Policy Review, vol. 1, pp. 133–164, www.norden.org/en/ 
publications/publikationer/2011-544. 
59. See Alison M. Shelton, Compensated Work Sharing Arrangements 
(Short-Time Compensation) as an Alternative to Layoffs, CRS 
Report for Congress R40689 (Congressional Research Service, 
January 4, 2012); and Wayne Vroman and Vera Brusentsev, 
“Short-Time Compensation as a Policy to Stabilize Employment” 
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, November 2009), 
www.urban.org/publications/411983.html. 
CBO 
24 UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO PERSISTENTLY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 
adjustment time to find new work, avoiding some or all 
of the potential permanent wage losses associated with 
layoffs.60 
Targeted Services. Over the past two decades, states have 
experimented with policies that provide extra services to 
those UI recipients projected to be most likely to exhaust 
their benefits. Under such policies, states use statistical 
models to predict who is likely to remain unemployed for 
26 or more weeks, and they then require those workers to 
participate in special job-search assistance programs as a 
condition of receiving UI benefits. Research suggests that 
such a policy, when well-targeted, can reduce the dura-
tion of unemployment, reduce UI expenditures, and 
improve the postunemployment earnings of UI recipi-
ents.61 However, over the past decade, states have increas-
ingly allowed UI claimants to make initial and continu-
ing claims over the phone and via the Internet, which has 
reduced the chances that those claimants will receive job-
search assistance and other reemployment services.62 
Facilitating Transitions to Employment 
Some unemployed people may be unable or unwilling to 
take advantage of available job opportunities, and certain 
policies could facilitate the transition to employment. 
People may not have information about available jobs or 
the skills to search effectively for them. They may also 
have to contend with the stigma resulting from long-term 
unemployment or immobility arising from housing 
constraints. 
Job-Search Assistance. Among the services offered by 
One-Stop Career Centers are group workshops that focus 
on job-search techniques and access to computerized job 
listings. For workers who fail to find a job quickly, those 
centers may offer additional higher-cost services that 
60. For discussion of those wage losses, see Congressional Budget 
Office, Losing a Job During a Recession. 
6 1 . See Dan A. Black, Jose C. Galdo, and Jeffrey A. Smith, “Evaluat-
ing the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services System 
Using a Regression Discontinuity Approach,” American Economic 
Review, vol. 97, no. 2 (May 2007), pp.104–107; and Paul T. 
Decker and others, Assisting Unemployment Insurance Claimants: 
The Long-Term Impacts of the Job Search Assistance Demonstration 
(report submitted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., to the 
Department of Labor, February 2000), www.upjohninst.org/erdc/ 
auic.html. 
62. See Christopher J. O’Leary, “State UI Job Search Rules and Reem-
ployment Services,” Monthly Labor Review, vol. 129, no. 6 (June 
2006), pp. 27–37, www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/06/art3abs.htm. 
include individualized counseling and, if other methods 
fail, vouchers for training programs. Findings from five 
demonstrations indicated that various combinations of 
job-search assistance and increased emphasis on work-
search rules were effective in reducing unemployment.63 
Skill Certification Programs. Skill certification programs 
can allay employers’ concerns about whether the long-
term unemployed are capable of being productive 
employees. Pure skill certification programs provide the 
unemployed with an opportunity to demonstrate their 
abilities to employers and thereby reduce the stigma of 
long-term unemployment.64 That approach, of course, 
works best if the unemployed have the skills that pro-
spective employers need. One example of a certification 
program for preexisting skills is the WorkKeys Career 
Readiness Certification used by a variety of states, includ-
ing Indiana, North Carolina, and Virginia. WorkKeys 
offers certification in a variety of areas, including reading, 
applied math, business writing, and applied technology. 
Such programs allow the unemployed to obtain skill 
certification without going through lengthy training 
programs. 
Housing Mobility Assistance. Helping the unemployed 
relocate might also reduce unemployment. However, 
recent federal housing policies aimed at helping people 
stay in their homes, while having various beneficial effects 
on people’s lives, could result in fewer people moving to 
areas where jobs might be more plentiful. Numerous 
efforts have been undertaken since 2008 to assist home-
owners who are underwater on their mortgages (that is, 
63. Meyer, “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experi-
ments”; and Louis S. Jacobson, “Strengthening One-Stop Career 
Centers: Helping More Unemployed Workers Find Jobs and 
Build Skills,” Brookings Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2009-01 
(April 2009), www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/ 
0402_jobs_skills_jacobson.aspx. 
64. Many states and localities offer some form of skill or work readi-
ness certification. Those programs are generally aimed at less-
skilled workers and may require some form of training before cli-
ents can take certification exams. Examples include the Workforce 
Alliance for Growth in the Economy (WAGE) certificate pro-
gram, which is conducted by the Arkansas Department of Career 
Education, and the Workforce Skills Certification System, which 
was developed by Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment Sys-
tems and is used in California, Connecticut, Oregon, and Wash-
ington. See Norma Rey-Alicea and Geri Scott, A Survey of Selected 
Work Readiness Certificates (prepared by Jobs for the Future for 
Skill Up Rhode Island, January 2007), www.jff.org/publications/ 
workforce/survey-selected-work-readiness-certifica/364. 
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who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are 
currently worth); those efforts have occurred largely 
through the auspices of the Making Home Affordable 
(MHA) program. The Emergency Homeowners’ Loan 
Program provided further loan relief specifically targeted 
to the unemployed. Those programs have been varied in 
their goals and, in the case of the largest (the $8 billion 
Hardest Hit Fund), have varied from state to state in 
their implementation. But their general goal has been to 
keep homeowners in their houses through mortgage 
modifications or assistance rather than to facilitate their 
move to a new location. MHA programs designed to 
facilitate short sales (when a homeowner sells his or her 
house for less than the mortgage amount owed) probably 
do make it easier for people to relocate, but those pro-
grams are small in relation to the majority of MHA pro-
grams that seek to keep homeowners in their homes. 
CBO 
